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ABSTRACT
The heated scholarly and public debate on the Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership (TTIP) has centred predominantly on two questions.
Firstly, is there something particularly special about TTIP, other than the fact
that it involves the world’s largest trading partners? And, secondly, is the
concern about TTIP’s deleterious effects justified? The starting point for our
argument is that understanding an agreement like TTIP requires an emphasis
on the socially constructed nature of reality. TTIP is ultimately novel in terms
of the regulatory scope of its provisions, and it is problematic because it
subtly promotes the (socially constructed) interests of those who merely see
regulation as inefficient ‘red tape’.
KEYWORDS constructivism; investment protection; regulatory co-operation; trade policy; transatlantic
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1. Introduction
It is by now generally acknowledged that the Transatlantic Trade and Invest-
ment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations between the European Union (EU) and
the United States (US) have led to ‘unprecedented debate’within Europe (Mal-
mström 2015). This heated discussion of TTIP in public and scholarly circles
has focused predominantly on two questions. Firstly, is there something par-
ticularly special about TTIP, other than the obvious fact that it involves the
world’s largest trading partners? And, secondly, is the concern about TTIP’s
deleterious effects justified? The answers, as the contributions to this
Debate Section will hopefully illustrate, often depend on one’s theoretical
stance. Those who see trade agreements as being chiefly about the exchange
of market access concessions and, more recently, aligning regulation for the
purposes of maximizing efficiencies see it as a positive, but not necessarily
that novel development (see the other contributions in this Section). Mean-
while, those who defend an interventionist role for the state in economic
life are more likely to see TTIP as not being ‘an ordinary trade deal’ but
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rather ‘about increasing corporate power and undermining the capacity of
governments… to regulate legitimate areas of public policy’ (Global Justice
Now 2015: 1).
It follows that understanding an agreement like TTIP requires an emphasis
on the socially constructed nature of reality. As Mark Blyth (2003: 695)
memorably put it, ‘structures do not come with an instruction sheet’: in a
fundamentally uncertain social world, actors need ideas to construct their
interests rather than merely rationally deducing these from material factors.
Thus, while tariff liberalization may well be easy to execute, and one’s interest
in or opposition to the elimination of a particular duty (say, on car imports)
may to some extent be deducible from one’s position in the material
economy, the increasingly complex regulatory requirements included in
trade agreements put a higher premium on interpretation. This is the core
of our argument: TTIP is novel in terms of the regulatory scope of its provisions,
and it is problematic because it subtly promotes the (socially constructed) inter-
ests of those who merely see regulation as inefficient ‘red tape’.
This contribution is structured as follows. In the second section, we show
why TTIP is a game-changer, focusing in particular on the agreement’s
impact beyond ratification on EU and US regulatory decision-making. In the
third section, we show why concerns about TTIP have merit, not because
we necessarily agree with the normative underpinnings of all critiques, but
because TTIP might restrict alternatives in the democratic process. We con-
clude by reflecting on what TTIP and the debate surrounding it might tell
us about recent developments in trade policy and beyond.
2. Why TTIP is a game-changer
We argue that TTIP is a (potential) game-changer. In other words, it is different
from previous (EU) trade agreements. Many might agree that TTIP is unique
because of its size: it is the most important bilateral (or rather, mega-regional)
trade agreement in terms of combined market size ever negotiated (e.g.,
Hamilton and Pelkmans 2015). It is, after all, a bilateral trade agreement
between the two largest economies in the world, which also suggests that
the negotiations are not as asymmetrical (Telò 2015: 34) as previous talks
between the EU and developing (e.g., Economic Partnership Agreements),
middle-income (e.g., EU–Mexico) or smaller industrialized countries (e.g.,
EU–Korea).
However, we diverge from others in our claim that TTIP is also qualitatively
different. The novelty for us lies in the domestic politics surrounding the
agreement and, ultimately, in how it is conceived to alter the state-market
relationship, notably through wide-ranging and deep commitments on regu-
latory co-operation and investment protection.
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2.1. Regulatory co-operation
Regulatory co-operation is one of the four ‘pillars’ around which the TTIP is
currently organized, the others being market access (e.g., tariff elimination
and the liberalization of services, investment and public procurement
markets), rules (on investment protection or ‘sustainable development’) and
an institutional pillar (European Commission 2016c). Crucially, the regulatory
pillar has been widely recognized, not least by the negotiating parties them-
selves, as the most important part of the agreement. According to an impact
assessment of TTIP, contracted by the European Commission before the
launch of the negotiations, two-thirds of the expected economic gains of
the agreement are due to come from eliminating regulatory differences
(Centre for Economic Policy Research [CEPR] 2013: 47).
The pillar contains chapters on technical barriers to trade (TBT); food safety
and animal and plant health (SPS), and nine sectoral annexes. Chapters on TBT
and SPS are common in trade agreements that have been negotiated after the
establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995 and generally
reiterate or modestly build on the obligations of the existing multilateral fra-
mework for such issues. In sectoral regulatory annexes, the objective is to
eliminate existing regulatory differences between the EU and the US to the
extent possible. Here, TTIP does offer considerably more coverage than pre-
vious agreements: the EU–Korea Free Trade Agreement (FTA) (KOREU) only
included four sector-specific annexes and the EU–Canada FTA (CETA) just one.
But most crucially, TTIP aims to be innovative in including provisions on
co-operation between both parties (a chapter on ‘regulatory co-operation’,
confusingly named in the same manner as the pillar as a whole) as well as
on domestic procedural disciplines in the development of new regulations
(a chapter on so-called ‘good regulatory practices’ [GRPs]). While CETA and
KOREU also contain chapters on, respectively, regulatory co-operation and
transparency, these chapters are short and contain largely shallow, voluntary
provisions (using noncommittal formulations such as ‘endeavour to’ or ‘may’).
Provisions on co-operation between both parties on future regulations and
domestic procedural disciplines on the development of new regulations were
initially to be included in a single horizontal chapter. The ambition in terms of
the scope and depth of this chapter was clear from the start. With regard to
scope, the initial position paper of the Commission stated that ‘the TTIP regu-
latory provisions would apply to regulation defined in a broad sense, i.e. cover-
ing all measures of general application, including both legislation and
implementing acts, regardless of the level at which they are adopted and of
the body which adopts them’. As for depth, the Commission’s ‘ultimate goal
would be a more integrated transatlantic market where goods produced and ser-
vices originating in one party could be marketed in the other without adap-
tations or requirements’ (European Commission 2013a: 2–3; emphasis added).
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The Commission’s aim was thus the establishment of a ‘transatlantic
market’ ruled by the principle of mutual recognition. The substantial elements
foreseen that would help realize this objective were an effective bilateral co-
operation mechanism, where the parties would keep each other informed on
forthcoming regulatory initiatives; an improved feedback mechanism allow-
ing each party to comment on proposed regulations emanating from the
other side of the Atlantic; co-operation in collecting and exchange of evidence
and data; strengthening the assessment of impacts of proposed regulations
on trade and investment flows and an ‘inbuilt agenda’ allowing the parties
to move towards greater regulatory convergence after the entry into force
of TTIP, making it a ‘dynamic, “living” agreement’. Institutionally, a body
with regulatory competences was foreseen that could, inter alia, consider
amendments to sectoral annexes and the addition of new ones, including
via a ‘simplified mechanism not entailing domestic ratification procedures’
(European Commission 2013a: 3–5).
This proposed horizontal chapter has since been divided into two chapters,
on regulatory co-operation and GRPs. But while the Commission has toned
down the language a bit in some areas (e.g., by eliminating the reference
to a ‘simplified mechanism’), most of these elements are still included in
the most recent EU textual proposals (European Commission 2016a, 2016b).
Some of the language on GRPs has even been strengthened at the insistence
of US negotiators, such as a new requirement to ‘promote periodic retrospec-
tive evaluations of regulatory frameworks’ (European Commission 2016a: 5;
emphasis added).1
2.2. Investment protection
Also setting TTIP apart from previous (EU) trade agreements are its proposed
provisions on investment protection. Since acquiring the competence for
negotiations on foreign direct investment (FDI) in the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon,
the EU has negotiated such provisions in bilateral trade agreements with Sin-
gapore and Canada. Building on the model used in the bilateral investment
treaties (BITs) of its member states, it has included substantial investment pro-
tection provisions (notably on indirect expropriation and fair and equitable
treatment) as well as an investor-to-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechan-
ism for enforcement. These typically allow foreign investors to seek redress
for perceived violations of their rights in independent tribunals (usually com-
posed of three arbitrators) which issue binding rulings on compensation (see
De Brabandere 2016).
Investment protection provisions and an ISDS mechanism in bilateral trea-
ties are thus nothing new as such: at the time of writing, the global number of
treaties including investment provisions stood at 3316 (UNCTAD 2016). Of
these, EU member states have concluded about 1,400 bilateral investment
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treaties before the Lisbon Treaty (European Commission 2013b). Moreover,
nine (Central and Eastern European) EU member states already have a BIT
in place with the US.2 For all these reasons, proponents of TTIP argue that
they fail to see what all the fuss regarding investment protection in TTIP is
about, as such agreements have been part of the landscape for many years
(see, for example, Eliasson and García-Duran, 2016).
But this is where the size of the EU–US investment relationship does come
in to make inclusion of investment protection a potential game-changer. Van
Harten (2014: 29) has shown that ISDS provisions covered around 15–20 per
cent of US FDI flows in 2012. He argues this would increase by an extra 50–60
per cent with TTIP. Hence, ‘[w]e are at a major turning point in the potential
expansion and locking-in of ISDS as a supreme decision-making body for
the world’ (Van Harten 2015: 2). Terminating TTIP is clearly more challenging
than doing so for individual BITs (IGO et al. 2015: 3–4). In this vein, and in
response to the criticism of ISDS that has emerged in the public debate
around TTIP, the Commission has proposed a new mechanism for investment
arbitration called the Investment Court System (ICS) which is seen as a step-
ping-stone towards a multilateral investment court, further institutionalizing
investment protection and arbitration globally (European Commission 2015).
2.3. The novel domestic politics of TTIP
Finally, we argue that TTIP is qualitatively different in terms of the domestic
politics it has unleashed, admittedly mainly on the EU side.3 Although there
has been cross-country variation even here, this does not take away from
the fact that an unprecedented number of organizations have become
active on TTIP.4 These, moreover, have often come from sectors that had
not been very active on trade agreements before, such as public health
non-governmental organizations [NGOs] (e.g., EPHA 2016) or local authorities
(e.g., CEMR 2015). Meanwhile, organizations that had to some extent been
active in trade policy prior to TTIP are dedicating more attention to the
issue and are generally adopting more critical positions than in the past.
The best examples include consumer organizations (BEUC 2016) and trade
unions, even from traditionally export-oriented and free trade-supportive
sectors such as the German automotive industry (IG Metall 2014). These
organizations have mobilized over concerns regarding the consequences of
regulatory co-operation and investment protection, the elements that make
TTIP qualitatively different and more ambitious than previous trade nego-
tiations. These fears have not been completely allayed by the transparency
initiatives of the Commission. In contrast, what we have hardly witnessed
(so far) is conflict between economic interest groups, which have generally
supported the negotiations. Only recently, and arguably in response to
societal mobilization, have we observed some disagreements between the
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European Commission and the member states, for example over the scope of
application of the horizontal regulatory provisions.5
TTIP thus represents a challenge for the literature on EU trade policy, which
very often adopts either a principal–agent or an interest-group perspective
(Poletti and De Bièvre 2014; Dür and Zimmermann 2007). The focus is thus
on the question, respectively, of whether EU trade policy is primarily driven
by the European Commission or the members states or by interest group
politics. The latter often draw (as De Bièvre and Poletti highlight in [2016])
on political economymodels of trade policy-making and international regulat-
ory co-operation to emphasize competition between exporters, import-com-
peting industries or (more recently) importers (Alt et al. 1996; Büthe and Mattli
2011), which has, however, been relatively absent in this case. A considerable
part of the literature has, furthermore, neglected the role of NGOs, with some
arguing explicitly that NGOs have little or no influence on EU trade policy (Dür
and De Bièvre 2007). While others have recognized the impact of the ‘new
trade agenda’ on domestic trade politics and the activation of new actors
(Young and Peterson 2006), they have not analysed the exact origins of
their concerns. Other authors have taken a more positive view of the
impact of NGOs on international economic agreements, albeit focusing on
very issue-specific deals, e.g. the Multilateral Agreement on Investment
(Walter 2001) or the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (Dür and Matteo
2014), which did not see the (so far) sustained cross-cutting mobilization
that has characterized the TTIP negotiations.
We argue that with TTIP normative, values-based concerns (instead of
purely economic or material motivations) and the role of NGOs will have to
feature more prominently in future studies of EU trade politics. Recently,
Young (2016) has also argued that the politics of TTIP are different from
those of earlier trade negotiations, with a confluence in transatlantic business
interests and with the opposition predominantly coming from less traditional,
civil society actors. While he also recognizes that ‘[t]he breadth and depth of
TTIP’s ambition has raised the stakes for civic interest groups beyond those
narrowly opposed to globalization’ (Young 2016: 364), we complement this
perspective in two ways. In this section we have explained in more detail
how TTIP’s proposed regulatory and investment protection provisions
render its ambition broader and deeper than that of previous trade agree-
ments. In the following section, we will be considering how justified the
critics’ concerns about these are, an issue Young does not directly touch upon.
3. Why concerns about TTIP have merit
Much of the debate on TTIP has been over the fear that it will result in lower
levels of social, environmental, health and consumer protection in the EU
(e.g., BEUC 2016; EPHA 2016; Global Justice Now 2015). A similar fear is
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voiced with regard to investment protection and ISDS clauses: they empower
firms to challenge public decision-making and may thus have a similar ‘chil-
ling effect’, dissuading governments from taking regulatory action (Eberhardt
2016). Finally, there is a widespread belief that ‘[t]he continuing lack of trans-
parency in the TTIP negotiations remains a major obstacle to the legitimacy of
any future deal’ (Hilary 2016: 10). But what are we to make of these concerns?
In contrast to the other authors in this section we find that, some exaggeration
aside, there are grounds to be concerned, as the agreement subtly shifts the
terms of societal debate regarding regulation, presenting this as the mere
elimination of inefficiencies or ‘red tape’.
3.1. Regulatory chill: horizontal regulatory provisions and
investment protection
Turning to the first issue, what are we to make of the claim that TTIP will have
a negative impact on regulatory standards? Our argument is that the agree-
ment could inhibit regulators, primarily by exposing them to subtle pressures
within a policy-making environment that increasingly privileges the elimin-
ation of trade barriers over other policy objectives. This is the central function
of the provisions rendering TTIP a ‘living agreement’ (the proposed provisions
on regulatory co-operation provisions and GRPs). Consider, for example, a
situation in which the Commission is contemplating a new regulation for pes-
ticides. Under the EU’s proposed regulatory co-operation provisions, it would
have to provide ‘opportunities for cooperation and information exchange, at
the earliest possible stage’ to the US (European Commission 2016b: 5). Under
the EU’s proposed provisions on GRPs, it would have to provide early warning
of its intention to regulate in the area, provide an opportunity for stakeholders
to comment and conduct an impact assessment that took into consideration
the ‘impact on international trade or investment’ (European Commission
2016a: 4). The danger, as critics have warned, is that this leads to ‘paralysis
by analysis’ in the regulatory process (EPHA et al. 2016) – mirroring similar
initiatives in the EU (the Better Regulation Agenda of reducing ‘red tape’ for
business) and the US system of ‘notice and comment’ (see De Ville and
Siles-Brügge 2016). It provides critics of increased regulation (e.g., the pesti-
cide industry in our example, or DG Trade officials concerned with the
impact on transatlantic economic relations) with opportunities and argu-
ments to object to the interest that (pesticides) regulators might have in
taking a particular action. There is a real-life parallel to this example: the Euro-
pean Commission has been accused of watering down its proposal for a new
regulation on pesticides and endocrine-disrupting chemicals in response to
industry and US pressure during the TTIP talks (Horel 2015).
The proposed provisions on regulatory co-operation are thus hardly an
unbiased ‘policy laboratory’ in which EU and US regulators meet to rationally
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deliberate on ‘good/best regulatory practices’ (Wiener and Alemanno 2015).
As a form of ‘soft law’, they are intended to influence the discursive context
in which regulation is forged by favouring certain voices (e.g., transnational
business groups) and considerations (minimizing the impact of regulation
on international trade and investment) (Gerstetter 2014). While the Commis-
sion has rowed back on its initial ambition for a provision that would allow for
regulatory annexes of TTIP to be amended without the need for subsequent
domestic ratification (European Commission 2013a), which would have
more directly usurped the power of legislators, the effect is still to alter the
agenda-setting context. Eliasson and García-Duran (2016) might thus be
right to criticize those who simply fear TTIP because of Eurocentric chauvin-
ism, while De Bièvre and Poletti (2016) have a point where they identify con-
straints on the ability of the Commission to water down standards, especially
(we would argue) when it comes to high-profile issues such as hormone-
treated beef or chlorinated chickens. The problem with TTIP’s horizontal regu-
latory provisions, however, is that they can restrict future regulation on either
side of the Atlantic if this runs counter to the logic of maximizing trade and
investment without the publicity of lifting a politicized ban on the import
of particular foodstuffs. The effect is thus also not one of the EU and US
jointly setting high standards for the global economy, as the other authors
in this section argue (see also Pauwelyn 2015); it is rather to depoliticize regu-
latory politics, empowering those who see ambitious levels of protection
against socioeconomic and environmental risks as irksome non-tariff barriers
(NTBs) requiring elimination.
A similar impact might be expected from TTIP’s provisions for investment
protection. One of the central lines of argument in the emerging political
science literature on investment treaty arbitration is that standards of invest-
ment protection have been interpreted increasingly broadly by arbitrators
with a rational interest in doing so (it is, after all, in their interest to maximize
their case load when their income is dependent on it). The consequence is
that investment protection provisions have increasingly interfered with gov-
ernment decisions, and not just in developing countries (Dupont and
Schultz 2016). Writing about the province of Ontario in Canada, Van Harten
and Scott find clear evidence of regulatory chill: the presence of investment
protection clauses ‘has led to internal vetting of proposed decisions in govern-
ment’, where ‘some officials [notably those from the Trade Ministry] have a
greater role in the vetting process than others do’ (Van Harten and Scott
2016: 116). Tienhaara (2011) provides an overview of several other cases of
‘regulatory chill’ in not just developing countries, but notably also (again) in
Canada, where existing ISDS cases (or the mere threat of bringing a claim)
led to several regulatory changes.
The issue is thus not so much tribunals overturning government decisions
as some critics have claimed (e.g., Monbiot 2013), but rather the subtle ways in
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which the presence of such provisions affects agenda-setting. The US and EU
member states already provide considerable protections for foreign investors
– so our argument is not that TTIP will lead to a surge in claims by US-based
firms, as indeed some of the TTIP critics targeted by Eliasson and García-
Duran’s (2016) charge of anti-Americanismmight argue. Indeed, the proposed
provisions (both the EU proposal and the US model BIT) arguably provide less
‘protection’ to investors than the North American Free Trade Agreement’s
(NAFTA’s) notorious Chapter 11. But, even if TTIP’s investment provisions do
not significantly increase the protection afforded to international investors,
there are still ‘particular ways in which an EU-US investment treaty would
still grant US investors legal rights that they would not otherwise have in
particular member states’ and vice-versa (otherwise, why insist on such
provisions in the first place?). This ‘may impose non-trivial costs, in the form
of litigation expenses and reduced policy space’ (Poulsen et al. 2015: 28, 1).
Taken together with the horizontal regulatory provisions – and contrary to
the view of the other authors in this section – the effect is thus likely to be to
inhibit those actors in decision-making who may take actions with a poten-
tially negative effect for big investors: if, say, as an official in the Environmental
Ministry, you were contemplating a ban on fracking, the potential for an ISDS
claim is something your colleagues from the Economy or Trade Ministry
would likely be keen to raise. It certainly provides a useful excuse for inaction,
to file under the generalized concern with maintaining ‘global competitive-
ness’ that governments are often wont to invoke (Hay and Rosamond
2002). And while the Commission has recently proposed a reform of the
system (the so-called ICS; see European Commission [2015]), this retains at
its core the problematic essence of investment treaty arbitration: standards
of protection that can be interpreted broadly; no watertight exemption for
state regulatory action in the public interest and case-by-case payment and
appointment of arbitrators chosen from a roster of experts in international
economic law (Van Harten 2015), reproducing the narrow ‘epistemic commu-
nity’ of existing investment treaty arbitrators (Salacuse 2010: 465–6). We can
thus expect these individuals to reproduce the (rational and socialization)
biases of the existing investment treaty arbitration system (see Dupont and
Schultz 2016), even if this system were converted into a multilateral court
as the Commission hopes to do.
3.2. Transparency and democratic legitimacy
What of the claim then that the TTIP negotiations lack transparency and there-
fore also democratic legitimacy? Again, there is considerable merit to such an
argument. To understand why, we must begin by examining how trade
policy-makers and scholars have traditionally conceptualized trade nego-
tiations and then turn to explaining why TTIP does not quite fit this mould.
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The starting point here has generally been the view that trade liberalization
is desirable, but that it faces important political obstacles for realization. Given
the high costs of organizing politically (the ‘logic of collective action’, see
Olson [1965]), the interest in trade protection, being concentrated in those
sectors negatively affected by trade liberalization, would thus usually trump
the more diffuse, general interest in a liberal trade policy, as represented,
for example, by consumers. One way of overcoming this was said to be the
delegation of trade policy-making from political figures to more technical
bodies, such as by the EU’s member states to the supranational European
Commission in the Treaty of Rome. Through such ‘collusive delegation’
states were said to be insulating themselves from protectionist pressures to
deliver the ‘public good’ of trade liberalization (Meunier 2005). A second
way of altering the balance of interests was to introduce ‘reciprocity’ to
trade talks, which helped to ‘concentrate’ the benefits of trade liberalization
on certain exporters (Gilligan 1997). Given this dominant understanding of
trade policy-making, it is not surprising that, in the case of TTIP, negotiators
began by arguing that secrecy was a necessary ‘rule of the game’. Given
the need to craft ‘reciprocal’ agreements, the argument was that it made
sense to keep provisional agreements with negative distributive effects for
certain domestic groups secret until a package deal was reached, which
might swing a sufficient majority in favour of ratifying the agreement.
However, TTIP is not a traditional trade agreement. Young (2016: 346)
explains the relatively uniform pro-TTIP alignment of transatlantic businesses
on the grounds that this negotiation is more about ‘realizing efficiency gains’
in global value chains and intra-firm trade ‘than securing market access’. While
we would not label these as neutral ‘efficiency gains’ but as deeply normative
questions about the role of regulation in society, the logic is clearly distinct
from the distributive nature of tariff or other market access negotiations.
Policy-makers’ initial defence of secrecy was therefore inconsistent with
their (simultaneous) claim that TTIP was not about exchanging concessions
but about seeking co-operative solutions to regulatory co-ordination pro-
blems. Indeed, in time, negotiators have come to realise the incongruity of
their position. This has led to several ‘transparency initiatives’ on the EU
side, which have seen the declassification of the EU negotiating mandate;
negotiating documents released to more MEPs and several EU negotiating
proposals being published on the Commission website. As consolidated docu-
ments (the key negotiating texts including both EU and US proposals, includ-
ing areas of [dis]agreement) are still not made public (at the insistence of the
US), other than through the likes of the Greenpeace ‘TTIP Leaks’, one can still
rightly criticize the secrecy of the talks and argue that trade negotiators’
impulse for ‘Green Room’-type discussions has yet to be decisively broken.
Given that legislators in the EU (theCouncil and the EP) and theUS (Congress)
will essentially be voting on a fait accompli,6 which has not been subjected to full
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scrutiny during its negotiation, this raises significant questions. Moreover, the
effect of the horizontal regulatory provisions (and arguably also of investment
protection) is to change the regulatory environment beyond TTIP’s ratification.
Whatever subtle, but potentially significant impacts this may have is unknow-
able at this stage and thus not the subject of a vote on ratification. The whole
purpose of such provisions may well be to avoid the need to subject the
wider TTIP agenda to democratic scrutiny in the first place.
4. Conclusion
We have argued that TTIP is substantially a qualitatively different trade agree-
ment (a ‘game-changer’) and that critics’ concerns about the agreement have
merit. What sets TTIP apart from earlier trade negotiations is the breadth and
depth of its ambitions with regard to regulatory co-operation and the effect
that its investment protection provisions will have in terms of expanding and
locking-in investment treaty arbitration globally. It is the combination of these
two substantial features of TTIP that has led to the mobilization of an unprece-
dented number and diverse group of civil society organizations. Every NGOwith
a mission to campaign for stricter regulation in a given area can reasonably fear
that TTIP will negatively affect the political playing field it will have to compete
on in the future. While claims that TTIP will lead to a massive deregulation
dynamic are certainly exaggerated, the concern about ‘regulatory chill’ cannot
simply be dismissed. If, after TTIP, regulatory proposals have to be more strictly
justified internally with regard to their trade and investment effects (under the
provisions on GRPs) as well as externally (under mandatory regulatory co-oper-
ation provisions) and can (once in force) also be challenged before an invest-
ment tribunal, it is not unreasonable to worry that this will benefit those who
prefer more business-friendly, light-touch regulation over other normative
visions of the role of regulation and state intervention in society. The contesta-
tion of TTIP might thus also be thought of in Polanyian terms as a societal move
against market ‘disembedding’ (Polanyi 1944).
TTIP shows the need to take civil society organizations and their normative
concerns regarding trade policy seriously. If we limit our analysis to economic
motivations and actors, it is very difficult to understand the current trade
policy debates on both sides of the Atlantic, and the trouble that TTIP has
run into. Clearly, actors in trade policy (which increasingly also means
voters) do not simply make a rational calculation of their economic interest
in a particular trade policy (which are also very difficult to know a priori),
but also take into account the potential or perceived effects of agreements
on other public policy objectives as well as on the autonomy of their national
(or local level of) government. These normative understandings of the conse-
quences of economic integration are not objectively knowledgeable but are
socially constructed. The central purpose of TTIP, after all, is to shape the
JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY 11
discursive environment in which regulations are crafted and to (subtly) privi-
lege one normative vision over another. There is also a wider applicability for
such constructivist insights given the ongoing backlash against aspects of
neoliberal globalization. If anything, the result of the United Kingdom’s EU
referendum showed how identity politics and the slogan of ‘taking back
control’ were an effective means of getting millions to vote for a policy that
was dismissed by the overwhelming majority of economic (and other) experts.
Notes
1. Interviews with NGO representatives and European Commission officials, Brus-
sels, February 2016.
2. Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia and
Lithuania.
3. While we cannot address this question at length here, we would argue that it is
difficult to explain the degree of domestic contestation of TTIP other than by
emphasising the salience of different understandings about the effects of TTIP
on the regulatory environment (what we could call ‘normative trade conflict’),
an issue we elaborate on below (see also De Ville and Siles-Brügge 2016;
Young 2016).
4. Two examples of evidence on this are the increased number of attendees at civil
society meetings (Gheyle 2016) and the record (for a trade-related consultation)
number of replies to the public consultation on ISDS (almost 150,000).
5. As the Commission itself has repeatedly highlighted (e.g., Rosário 2015), its
mandate for the negotiations has been unanimously approved by the
member states. There was, in fact, very little discussion of the mandate, apart
from with regard to the very specific issue of audiovisual services, a traditional
sensitive topic in France. This was therefore excluded from the scope of the talks.
6. Neither the Council nor the European Parliament has the power to amend trade
agreements, while under existing US Trade Promotion Authority (colloquially
known as ‘fast-track’) trade agreements are only subject to an up-or-down
vote in Congress.
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank the other contributors, the anonymous referees, as well as the
attendees of our panel on TTIP at the ‘EU in International Affairs Conference’ 2016 in
Brussels for their very helpful comments on earlier drafts.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Funding
The research behind this article has benefitted from funding from the UK Economic
and Social Research Council.
12 F. DE VILLE AND G. SILES-BRÜGGE
Notes on contributors
Ferdi De Ville is assistant professor of politics in the Centre of EU Studies, Ghent
University.
Gabriel Siles-Brügge is associate professor in the Department of Politics and Inter-
national Studies, University of Warwick. Gabriel Siles-Brügge is President of the
Health and Trade Network and Scientific Advisor on Trade Policy to the European
Public Health Alliance, organisations that have campaigned on TTIP.
References
Alt, J.E., Frienden, J., Gilligan, M., Rodrik, D. and Rogowski, R. (1996) ‘The political
economy of international trade: enduring puzzles and an agenda for inquiry’,
Comparative Political Studies 29(6): 689–717.
BEUC (2016) ‘Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)’, available at
http://www.beuc.eu/general/tradettip (accessed 18 October 2016).
Blyth, M. (2003) ‘Structures do not come with an instruction sheet: interests, ideas, and
progress in political science’, Perspectives on Politics 1(4): 695–706.
Büthe, T. and Mattli, W. (2011) The New Global Rulers: The Privatization of Regulation in
the World Economy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
CEMR (2015) ‘Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP): commitments
must comply with local and regional autonomy’, position paper, May, available at
http://www.ccre.org/img/uploads/piecesjointe/filename/CEMR_position_paper_TTIP_
EN.pdf (accessed 18 October 2016).
CEPR (2013) Reducing Transatlantic Barriers to Trade and Investment: An Economic
Assessment, London: Centre for Economic Policy Research.
De Bièvre, D. and Poletti, A. (2016) ‘Why the transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnerhsip is not (so) new, and why it is not (so) bad’, Journal of European Policy,
doi:10.1080/13501763.2016.1254274.
De Brabandere, E. (2016) Investment Treaty Arbitration as Public International Law,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
De Ville, F. and Siles-Brügge, G. (2016) TTIP: The Truth about the Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership, Cambridge: Polity.
Dupont, C. and Schultz, T. (2016) ‘Towards a new heuristic model: investment arbitra-
tion as a political system’, Journal of International Dispute Resolution 7(1): 3–30.
Dür, A., and De Bièvre, D. (2007) ‘Inclusion without influence? NGOs in European trade
policy’, Journal of Public Policy 27(1): 79–101.
Dür, A., and Mateo, G. (2014) ‘Public opinion and interest group influence: how citizen
groups derailed the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement’, Journal of European
Public Policy 21(8): 1199–217.
Dür, A. and Zimmermann, H. (2007) ‘Introduction: the EU in international trade nego-
tiations’, Journal of Common Market Studies 45(4): 771–87.
Eberhardt, P. (2016) The Zombie ISDS: Rebranded as ICS, Rights for Corporations to Sue
States Refuse to Die, Brussels: Corporate Europe Observatory et al.
Eliasson, JL. and Garcia-Duran, P. (2016) ‘Why TTIP is an unprecedented geopolitical
game-changer, but not a Polanyian moment’, Journal of European Policy, doi:10.
1080/13501763.2016.1254275.
EPHA (2016) ‘Healthy trade (TTIP)’, available at http://epha.org/trade-and-health/
(accessed on 18 March 2016).
JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY 13
EPHA, EHN and EASL (2016) ‘Paralysis by analysis: public health concerns on regulatory
cooperation in TTIP’, press release, 18 March, available at http://epha.org/IMG/pdf/
Press_Release_COM_Regulatory_Cooperation_proposal_220316.pdf (accessed on
18 October 2016).
European Commission (2013a) EU–US Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership:
Trade Cross-cutting Disciplines and Institutional Provisions: Initial Position Paper,
Brussels: European Commission.
European Commission (2013b) ‘EU investment policy: state of play’, presentation to
civil society dialogue, Brussels, April, available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/
docs/2013/april/tradoc_150853.pdf (accessed 18 October 2016).
European Commission (2015) Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: Trade in
Services, Investment and E-Commerce – Chapter II – Investment, Brussels: European
Commission.
European Commission (2016a) TTIP – EU Proposal for Chapter: Good Regulatory
Practices, Brussels: European Commission.
European Commission (2016b) TTIP – EU Proposal for Chapter: Regulatory Cooperation,
Brussels: European Commission.
European Commission (2016c) ‘EU negotiation texts in TTIP’, 14 July, available at http://
trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1230 (accessed 18 October 2016).
Gerstetter, C. (2014) Regulatory Cooperation under TTIP – a Risk for Democracy and
National Regulation, Berlin: Ecologic Institute and Heinrich Böll Stiftung.
Gheyle, N. (2016) ‘Adding fuel to the flames. how TTIP reinvigorated the politicization
of trade’, paper presented at the GIFTA workshop series ‘Social and Labour Impacts
of Free Trade Agreements’, 7–8 July, Brussels.
Gilligan, M.J. (1997) Empowering Exporters: Reciprocity, Delegation, and Collective Action
in American Trade Policy, Ann Arbour, MI: University of Michigan Press.
Global Justice Now (2015) ‘The EU–US trade deal: how TTIP could cripple local govern-
ment’, June, available at http://www.globaljustice.org.uk/sites/default/files/files/
resources/local_authorities_briefing_0.pdf (accessed 18 October 2016).
Hamilton, D.S. and Pelkmans, J. (2015) ‘Rule-makers or rule-takers? An introduction to
TTIP’, in D.S. Hamilton and J. Pelkmans (eds), Rule-makers or Rule-takers: Exploring the
Transaltantic Trade and Investment Partnership, Brussels: CEPS, pp. 1–16.
Hay, C. and Rosamond, B. (2002) ‘Globalization, European integration and the discur-
sive construction of external economic constraints’, Journal of European Public
Policy 9(2): 147–67.
Hilary, J. (2016) ‘The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: A charter for dereg-
ulation, an attack on jobs, and end to democracy’, April, available at http://www.
rosalux.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/ttip_john_hilary_en_2016.pdf (accessed 7
November 2016).
Horel, S. (2015) A Toxic Affair: How the Chemical Lobby Blocked Action on Hormone
Disrupting Chemicals, Brussels: Corporate Europe Observatory.
IG Metall (2014) ‘Freihandelsabkommen TTIP: Abkommen nur mit höchsten Arbeits-
und Sozialstandards’, available at https://www.igmetall.de/ttip-transatlantisches-
freihandelsabkommen-zwischen-der-eu-und-13347.htm (accessed 18 October
2016).
IGO, Vedegylet and TNI (2015) ‘Central and Eastern European countries at the cross-
roads: why governments should reject investment arbitration in TTIP’, Policy Brief,
June, available at http://www.s2bnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/
governments_should_reject_isds_in_ttip.pdf (accessed 18 October 2016).
14 F. DE VILLE AND G. SILES-BRÜGGE
Malmström, C. (2015) ‘Opening remarks at EP debate on TTIP’, Strasbourg, 7 July, avail-
able at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/july/tradoc_153598.pdf (accessed
18 October 2016).
Meunier, S. (2005) Trading Voices: The European Union in International Commercial
Negotiations, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Monbiot, G. (2013) ‘This transatlantic deal is a full-frontal assault on democracy’, The
Guardian, 4 November.
Olson, M. (1965) The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups,
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Pauwelyn, J. (2015) ‘Taking preferences out of preferential trade agreements: TTIP as a
provider of global public goods?’, in J.F. Morin, T. Novotnáand and M. Telò (eds), The
Politics of Transatlantic Trade Negotiations: TTIP in a Globalized World, Farnham:
Ashgate, pp. 187–96.
Polanyi, K. (1944) The Great Transformation, New York: Farrar & Rinehart.
Poletti, A. and De Bièvre, D. (2014) ‘The political science of European trade policy: a lit-
erature review with a research outlook’, Comparative European Politics 12(1): 101–19.
Poulsen, L., Bonnitcha, J. and Yackee, J. (2015) Transatlantic Treaty Protection, Brussels
and Washington, DC: CEPS and Center for Transatlantic Relations.
Rosário, D. (2015) ‘The European Commission consults all stakeholders on TTIP, not just
business’, The Guardian, Letters, 1 December.
Salacuse, J.W. (2010) ‘The emerging global regime for investment’, Harvard
International Law Journal 51(2): 427–73.
Telò, M. (2015) ‘Transatlantic partnership and global governance from the EU’s per-
spective’, in J.F. Morin, T. Novotná, and M. Telò (eds), The Politics of Transatlantic
Trade Negotiations: TTIP in a Globalized World, Farnham: Ashgate, pp. 27–42.
Tienhaara, K. (2011) ‘Regulatory chill and the threat of arbitration: a view from political
science’, in C. Brown and K. Miles (eds), Evolution in Investment Treaty Law and
Arbitration, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 606–28.
UNCTAD (2016) ‘International investment agreements navigator’, available at http://
investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA (accessed 18 October 2016).
Van Harten, G. (2014) ‘Comments on the European Commission’s approach to inves-
tor–state arbitration in TTIP and CETA’, Osgoode Hall Law School Legal Studies
Research Paper No. 59/2014, Toronto: York University.
Van Harten, G. (2015) ‘A parade of reforms: the European Commission’s latest proposal
for ISDS’, Osgoode Hall Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 21/2015, Toronto:
York University.
Van Harten, G. and Scott, D.N. (2016) ‘Investment treaties and the internal vetting of
regulatory proposals: a case study from Canada’, Journal of International Dispute
Resolution 7(1): 92–116.
Walter, A. (2001) ‘NGOs, business, and international investment: the Multilateral
Agreement on Investment, Seattle, and beyond’, Global Governance 7(1): 51–73.
Wiener, J.B. and Alemanno, A. (2015) ‘The future of regulatory cooperation: TTIP as a
learning process toward a global policy laboratory’, Law and Contemporary
Problems 78(4): 103–36.
Young, A.R. (2016) ‘Not your parents’ trade politics: the Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership negotiations’, Review of International Political Economy 23
(3): 345–78.
Young, A.R. and Peterson, J. (2006) ‘The EU and the new trade politics’, Journal of
European Public Policy 13(6): 795–814.
JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY 15
